Introduction
The MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS) has been widely accepted not only for providing digital TV services, but also as a subnetwork technology for building IP networks. RFC 4326 [RFC4326] describes the Unidirectional Lightweight Encapsulation (ULE) mechanism for the transport of IPv4 and IPv6 Datagrams and other network protocol packets directly over the ISO MPEG-2 Transport Stream as TS Private Data. ULE specifies a base encapsulation format and supports an Extension Header format that allows it to carry additional header information to assist in network/Receiver processing. The encapsulation satisfies the design and architectural requirement for a lightweight encapsulation defined in RFC 4259 [RFC4259] .
Section 3.1 of RFC 4259 presents several topological scenarios for MPEG-2 Transmission Networks. A summary of these scenarios is presented below:
A. Broadcast TV and Radio Delivery. This is not within the scope of this document.
B. Broadcast Networks used as an ISP. This resembles scenario A, but includes IP services to access the public Internet.
C. Unidirectional Star IP Scenario. This provides a data network delivering a common bit stream to typically medium-sized groups of Receivers.
D. Datacast Overlay. This employs MPEG-2 physical and link layers to provide additional connectivity such as unidirectional multicast to supplement an existing IP-based Internet service.
E. Point-to-Point Links. This connectivity may be provided using a pair of transmit and receive interfaces.
F. Two-Way IP Networks.
RFC 4259 states that ULE must be robust to errors and security threats. Security must also consider both unidirectional (A, B, C, and D) as well as bidirectional (E and F) links for the scenarios mentioned above.
An initial analysis of the security requirements in MPEG-2 transmission networks is presented in the "Security Considerations" section of RFC 4259. For example, when such networks are not using a wireline network, the normal security issues relating to the use of wireless links for transport of Internet traffic should be considered [RFC3819] .
Cruickshank, et al. The security considerations of RFC 4259 recommend that any new encapsulation defined by the IETF should allow Transport Stream encryption and should also support optional link-layer authentication of the Subnetwork Data Unit (SNDU) payload. In ULE [RFC4326] , it is suggested that this may be provided in a flexible way using Extension Headers. This requires the definition of a mandatory Extension Header, but has the advantage that it decouples specification of the security functions from the encapsulation functions.
This document extends the above analysis and derives in detail the security requirements for ULE in MPEG-2 transmission networks.
A security framework for deployment of secure ULE networks describing the different building blocks and the interface definitions is presented in Appendix A.
Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Other terms used in this document are defined below:
ATSC: Advanced Television Systems Committee. A framework and a set of associated standards for the transmission of video, audio, and data using the ISO MPEG-2 Standard. Tables [ISO-MPEG2] . The all-ones PID value 0x1FFF indicates a Null TS Packet introduced to maintain a constant bit rate of a TS Multiplex. There is no required relationship between the PID values used for TS Logical Channels transmitted using different TS Multiplexes.
Receiver: Equipment that processes the signal from a TS Multiplex and performs filtering and forwarding of encapsulated PDUs to the network-layer service (or bridging module when operating at the link layer).
SI Table: Service Information Table [ Table (NIT) . In existing MPEG-2 transmission networks, these messages are broadcast in the clear (no encryption or integrity checks). The integrity as well as authenticity of these messages is important for correct working of the ULE network, i.e., supporting its security objectives in the area of availability, in addition to confidentiality and integrity. One method recently proposed [RFC5163] encapsulates these messages using ULE. In such cases all the security requirements of this document apply in securing these signalling messages.
ULE Stream security only concerns the security between the ULE Encapsulation Gateway (ULE Encapsulator) and the Receiver. In many deployment scenarios the user of a ULE Stream has to secure communications beyond the link since other network links are utilised in addition to the ULE link. Therefore, if authentication of the endpoints, i.e., the IP Sources, is required, or users are concerned RFC 5458
Security Requirements for ULE  March 2009 about loss of confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of their communication data, they will have to employ end-to-end network security mechanisms, e.g., IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS). Governmental users may be forced by regulations to employ specific approved implementations of those mechanisms. Hence, for such cases, the requirements for confidentiality and integrity of the user data will be met by the end-to-end security mechanism and the ULE security measures would focus on providing traffic flow confidentiality either for user data that has already been encrypted or for users who choose not to implement end-to-end security mechanisms.
ULE links may also be used for communications where the two IP endpoints are not under central control (e.g., when browsing a public web site). In these cases, it may be impossible to enforce any endto-end security mechanisms. Yet, a common objective is that users may make the same security assumptions as for wired links [RFC3819] . ULE security could achieve this by protecting the vulnerable (in terms of passive attacks) ULE Stream.
In contrast to the above, a ULE Stream can be used to link networks such as branch offices to a central office. ULE link-layer security could be the sole provider of confidentiality and integrity. In this scenario, users requiring high assurance of security (e.g., government use) will need to employ approved cryptographic equipment (e.g., at the network layer). An implementation of ULE Link Security equipment could also be certified for use by specific user communities.
Threats
The simplest type of network threat is a passive threat. This includes eavesdropping or monitoring of transmissions, with a goal to obtain information that is being transmitted. In broadcast networks (especially those utilising widely available low-cost physical layer interfaces, such as DVB), the passive threats are the major threats. One example is an intruder monitoring the MPEG-2 transmission broadcast and then extracting the data carried within the link. Another example is an intruder trying to determine the identity of the communicating parties and the volume of their traffic by sniffing (L2) addresses. This is a well-known issue in the security field; however, it is more of a problem in the case of broadcast networks such as MPEG-2 transmission networks because of the easy availability of Receiver hardware and the wide geographical span of the networks. o Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: When an entity fails to perform its proper function or acts in a way that prevents other entities from performing their proper functions.
The active threats mentioned above are major security concerns for the Internet community [BELLOVIN] . Masquerading and modification of IP packets are comparatively easy in an Internet environment, whereas such attacks are in fact much harder for MPEG-2 broadcast links. This could, for instance, motivate the mandatory use of sequence numbers in IPsec, but not for synchronous links. This is further reflected in the security requirements for Case 2 and 3 in Section 4 below.
As explained in Section 3.1, the PID associated with an Elementary Stream can be modified (e.g., in some systems by reception of an updated SI table, or in other systems until the next announcement/discovery data is received). An attacker that is able to modify the content of the received multiplex (e.g., replay data and/or control information) could inject data locally into the received stream with an arbitrary PID value.
Threat Cases
Analysing the topological scenarios for MPEG-2 Transmission Networks in Section 1, the security threats can be abstracted into three cases:
o Case 1: Monitoring (passive threat). Here the intruder monitors the ULE broadcasts to gain information about the ULE data and/or tracking the communicating parties identities (by monitoring the destination NPA address). In this scenario, measures must be taken to protect the ULE payload data and the identity of ULE Receivers. Here an intruder is assumed to be sufficiently sophisticated to override the original transmission from the ULE Encapsulation Gateway and deliver a modified version of the MPEG-TS transmission to a single ULE Receiver or a small group of Receivers (e.g., in a single company site). The MPEG-2 transmission network operator might not be aware of such attacks. Measures must be taken to ensure ULE data integrity and authenticity and preventing replay of old messages.
o Case 3: Globally conducting active attacks on the MPEG-TS multiplex. This assumes a sophisticated intruder able to override the whole MPEG-2 transmission multiplex. The requirements are similar to case 2. The MPEG-2 transmission network operator can usually identify such attacks and provide corrective action to restore the original transmission.
For both Cases 2 and 3, there can be two sub-cases:
o Insider attacks, i.e., active attacks from adversaries within the network with knowledge of the secret material.
o Outsider attacks, i.e., active attacks from adversaries without knowledge of the secret material.
In terms of priority, Case 1 is considered the major threat in MPEG-2 transmission systems. Case 2 is considered a lesser threat, appropriate to specific network configurations, especially when vulnerable to insider attacks. Case 3 is less likely to be found in an operational network, and is expected to be noticed by the MPEG-2 transmission operator. It will require restoration of the original transmission. The assumption being that physical access to the network components (multiplexers, etc.) and/or connecting physical media is secure. Therefore, Case 3 is not considered further in this document.
Security Requirements for IP over MPEG-2 TS
From the threat analysis in Section 3, the following security requirements can be derived: Req 3. Integrity protection and source authentication of ULE Stream data are OPTIONAL. These can be used to prevent the active attacks described in Section 3.2.
Req 4. Protection against replay attacks is OPTIONAL. This is used to counter the active attacks described in Section 3.2.
Req 5. L2 ULE Source and Receiver authentication is OPTIONAL. This can be performed during the initial key exchange and authentication phase, before the ULE Receiver can join a secure session with the ULE Encapsulator (ULE source). This could be either unidirectional or bidirectional authentication based on the underlying key management protocol.
Other general requirements for all threat cases for link-layer security are:
GReq (a) ULE key management functions MUST be decoupled from ULE security services such as encryption and source authentication. This allows the independent development of both systems.
GReq (b) Support SHOULD be provided for automated as well as manual insertion of keys and policy into the relevant databases.
GReq (c) Algorithm agility MUST be supported. It should be possible to update the crypto algorithms and hashes when they become obsolete without affecting the overall security of the system.
GReq (d)
The security extension header MUST be compatible with other ULE extension headers. The method must allow other extension headers (either mandatory or optional) to be used in combination with a security extension. It is RECOMMENDED that these are placed after the security extension header. This permits full protection for all headers. It also avoids situations where the SNDU has to be discarded on processing the security extension header, while preceding headers have already been evaluated. One exception is the Timestamp extension that SHOULD precede the security extension header [RFC5163] . In this case, the timestamp will be unaffected by security services such as data confidentiality and can be decoded without the need for key material.
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Examining the threat cases in Section 3.3, the security requirements for each case can be summarised as: [RFC4082] in order to provide integrity protection and source authentication (Reqs 3 and 5). In addition, sequence numbers (Req 4) MAY be used to protect against replay attacks. In terms of outsider attacks, group authentication using Message Authentication Codes can provide the required level of security (Reqs 3 and 5). This will significantly reduce the ability of intruders to successfully inject their own data into the MPEG-TS stream. However, scenario 2 threats apply only in specific service cases, and therefore authentication and protection against replay attacks are OPTIONAL. Such measures incur additional transmission as well as processing overheads. Moreover, intrusion detection systems may also be needed by the MPEG-2 network operator. These should best be coupled with perimeter security policy to monitor common DoS attacks.
o Case 3: As stated in Section 3.3, the requirements here are similar to Case 2, but since the MPEG-2 transmission network operator can usually identify such attacks, the constraints on intrusion detections are less than in Case 2. Security services may be grouped into profiles based on security requirements, e.g., a base profile (with payload encryption and identity protection) and a second profile that extends this to also provide source authentication and protection against replay attacks. Although the use of specific security techniques is optional, it is RECOMMENDED that receiver devices should implement all the techniques in Reqs 2-5 of Section 4 to ensure interoperability of all profiles.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A modular design of ULE security may allow it to use and benefit from existing key management protocols, such as the Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP) [RFC4535] [GSE] .
The security threats and requirements presented in this document are applicable to ULE and GSE encapsulations.
Summary
This document analyses a set of threats and security requirements. It defines the requirements for ULE security and states the motivation for link security as a part of the Encapsulation layer.
ULE security must provide link-layer encryption and ULE Receiver identity protection. The framework must support the optional ability to provide for link-layer authentication and integrity assurance, as well as protection against insertion of old (duplicated) data into the ULE Stream (i.e., replay protection). This set of features is optional to reduce encapsulation overhead when not required.
ULE Stream security between a ULE Encapsulation Gateway and the corresponding Receiver(s) is considered an additional security mechanism to IPsec, TLS, and application layer end-to-end security, and not as a replacement. It allows a network operator to provide similar functions to that of IPsec, but in addition provides MPEG-2 transmission link confidentiality and protection of ULE Receiver identity (NPA address).
Appendix A describes a set of building blocks that may be used to realise a framework that provides ULE security functions.
Security Considerations
Link-layer (L2) encryption of IP traffic is commonly used in broadcast/radio links to supplement end-to-end security (e.g., provided by TLS [RFC5246] , SSH [RFC4251] , IPsec [RFC4301] ).
RFC 5458 Security Requirements for ULE March 2009
A common objective is to provide the same level of privacy as wired links. It is recommended that an ISP or user provide end-to-end security services based on well-known mechanisms such as IPsec or TLS.
This document provides a threat analysis and derives the security requirements to provide link encryption and optional link-layer integrity/authentication of the SNDU payload.
There are some security issues that were raised in RFC 4326 [RFC4326] that are not addressed in this document (i.e., are out of scope), e.g.:
o The security issue with un-initialised stuffing bytes. In ULE, these bytes are set to 0xFF (normal practice in MPEG-2).
o Integrity issues related to the removal of the LAN FCS in a bridged networking environment. The removal of bridged frames exposes the traffic to potentially undetected corruption while being processed by the Encapsulator and/or Receiver.
o There is a potential security issue when a Receiver receives a PDU with two Length fields. The Receiver would need to validate the actual length and the Length field and ensure that inconsistent values are not propagated by the network.
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A.1.2. ULE Security Databases Block
There needs to be two databases, i.e., similar to the IPsec databases.
o ULE-SAD: ULE Security Association Database contains all the Security Associations that are currently established with different ULE peers.
o ULE-SPD: ULE Security Policy Database contains the policies as described by the system manager. These policies describe the security services that must be enforced.
While traditionally link-layer security has operated using simple policy mechanisms, it is envisaged that ULE security should provide flexibility comparable to IPsec. The above design is based on the two databases defined for IPsec [RFC4301] . These databases could be used to implement either simple policies (as in traditional link security services) or more complex policies (as in IPsec).
The exact details of the header patterns that the SPD and SAD will have to support for all use cases will be described in a separate document. This document only highlights the need for such interfaces between the ULE data plane and the Key Management control plane.
A.1.3. ULE Extension Header Block
A new security extension header for the ULE protocol is required to provide the security features of data confidentiality, identity protection, data integrity, data authentication, and mechanisms to prevent replay attacks. Security keying material will be used for the different security algorithms (for encryption/decryption, MAC generation, etc.), which are used to meet the security requirements, described in detail in Section 4 of this document.
This block will use the keying material and policy information from the ULE Security Database Block on the ULE payload to generate the secure ULE Extension Header or to decipher the secure ULE extension header to get the ULE payload. An example overview of the ULE Security extension header format along with the ULE header and payload is shown in Figure 3 below.
RFC 5458
Security Requirements for ULE March 2009 While the first interface is used by the Key Management Block to insert keys, security associations, and policies into the ULE Database Block, the second interface is used by the ULE Security Extension Header Block to get the keys and policy material for generation of the security extension header.
A.2.1. Key Management <-> ULE Security Databases
This interface is between the Key Management Block of a group member (GM client) and the ULE Security Database Block (shown in Figure 2 ). The Key Management GM entity will communicate with the GCKS and then get the relevant security information (keys, cipher mode, security service, ULE_Security_ID, and other relevant keying material as well as policy) and insert this data into the ULE Security Database Block. The Key Management could be either automated (e.g., GSAKMP [RFC4535] or GDOI [RFC3547] ), or security information could be manually inserted using this interface. o There is an extra transmission overhead associated with using IPsec in tunnel mode, i.e., the extra IP header (IPv4 or IPv6).
o There is a need to protect the identity (NPA address) of ULE Receivers over the ULE broadcast medium; IPsec is not suitable for providing this service. In addition, the interfaces of these devices do not necessarily have IP addresses (they can be L2 devices).
o Multicast is considered a major service over ULE links. The current IPsec specifications [RFC4301] only define a pairwise tunnel between two IPsec devices with manual keying. Work is in progress in defining the extra detail needed for multicast and to use the tunnel mode with address preservation to allow efficient multicasting. For further details refer to [RFC5374] .
B.2. Link Security below the Encapsulation Layer
Link layer security can be provided at the MPEG-2 TS layer (below ULE). MPEG-2 TS encryption encrypts all TS Packets sent with a specific PID value. However, an MPEG-2 TS may typically multiplex several IP flows, belonging to different users, using a common PID. Therefore, all multiplexed traffic will share the same security keys.
This has the following advantages:
o The bit stream sent on the broadcast network does not expose any L2 or L3 headers, specifically all addresses, type fields, and length fields are encrypted prior to transmission.
o This method does not preclude the use of IPsec, TLS, or any other form of higher-layer security.
However it has the following disadvantages:
o When a PID is shared between several users, each ULE Receiver needs to decrypt all MPEG-2 TS Packets with a matching PID, possibly including those that are not required to be forwarded. Therefore, it does not have the flexibility to separately secure individual IP flows.
Cruickshank, et al. o When a PID is shared between several users, the ULE Receivers will have access to private traffic destined to other ULE Receivers, since they share a common PID and key.
o IETF-based key management that is very flexible and secure is not used in existing MPEG-2 based systems. Existing access control mechanisms in such systems have limited flexibility in terms of controlling the use of keying and rekeying. Therefore, if the key is compromised, this will impact several ULE Receivers.
Currently, there are few deployed L2 security systems for MPEG-2 transmission networks. Conditional access for digital TV broadcasting is one example. However, this approach is optimised for TV services and is not well-suited to IP packet transmission. Some other systems are specified in standards such as MPE [ETSI-DAT], but there are currently no known implementations and these methods are not applicable to GSE.
B.3. Link Security as a Part of the Encapsulation Layer
Examining the threat analysis in Section 3 has shown that protection of ULE Stream from eavesdropping and ULE Receiver identity are major requirements.
There are several advantages in using ULE link-layer security:
o The protection of the complete ULE Protocol Data Unit (PDU) including IP addresses. The protection can be applied either per IP flow or per Receiver NPA address.
o Ability to protect the identity of the Receiver within the MPEG-2 transmission network at the IP layer and also at L2.
o Efficient protection of IP multicast over ULE links.
o Transparency to the use of Network Address Translation (NATs) [RFC3715] and TCP Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEP) [RFC3135] , which require the ability to inspect and modify the packets sent over the ULE link.
This method does not preclude the use of IPsec at L3 (or TLS [RFC5246] at L4). IPsec and TLS provide strong authentication of the endpoints in the communication.
